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Professor Elaine Gagliardi on The Magical Power of Appointment:  Allows Trustor to 
Achieve Targeted Tax Consequences and Flexibility of Control 
 
By Professor Elaine Gagliardi

 
 
§ 1.01 Introduction 
 
As children, and sometimes as adults, we wish for magical powers to order the world in the way we 
want.  Estate planners can make that wish come true for some clients and beneficiaries with 
judicious use of powers of appointment.  Powers of appointment are uniquely suited to achieving 
targeted planning goals and increasing trust flexibility.  Planning techniques, old and new, including 
the oft used Crummey trust
1
 and the more recently developed array of acronym trusts designed to 
achieve specific tax consequences, such as the intentionally defective grantor trust (IDGT)
2
 and the 
Delaware incomplete non-grantor trust (DING)
3
 to name a few, rest in large part on creative uses of 
powers.  The magic of the power of appointment lies in the fact that its form informs its substance.  
Powers of appointment can avoid the strictures of fiduciary duties and courts recognize the form of 
powers of appointment regardless of a decision to exercise the power.  Powers of appointment 
designed to avoid characterization as general powers, can achieve beneficial income, estate, gift and 
generation-skipping transfer tax consequences, assist in the avoidance of creditor claims, provide 
for modification of trust terms, and center decision making in family members.  Is there any other 
legally enforceable right over or interest in property that can be used to achieve such a broad array 
of planning goals? 
The article begins by addressing the niche, historical and present, served by powers of appointment 
in Part 2.  It moves to exploring the “magic” of the power of appointment which derives from its 
flexible nonfiduciary characteristics and also from the respect courts accord its form for tax 
purposes.  The ability of planners to mesh substance in the design of the power’s form yields a 
legally enforceable right with respect to property that can be used by clients to achieve targeted 
goals and flexibility to change with circumstances. Both state law and tax law work to implement 
these important characteristics, and the article discusses both in Parts 3 and 4, respectively. The 
                                                            
 Elaine Gagliardi is a Professor at the University of Montana, Blewett School of Law.  She is a member of both the 
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel and the American College of Tax Counsel.  She co-authors Modern 
Estate Planning, 2nd Ed. (LexisNexis) and currently authors How to Save Time and Taxes Handling Estates (Mathew 
Bender).  
1 See Crummey v. Comm’r, TC Memo. 1966-144, aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir 1968). 
2 “IDGT” refers to the intentionally defective grantor trust, designed to qualify for grantor trust status.  The IDGT has 
become so ensconced in estate planning jargon that it has now become a defined term on investment websites, see, e.g., 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/igdt.asp (accessed December 16, 2015). 
3 “DING” refers to the Delaware incomplete non-grantor trust designed to avoid state income tax.  See J. Blattmachr and 
W. Lipkind, Fundamentals of DING Type Trusts:  No Gift Not a Grantor Trust, Vol. 26, No. 4 Probate and Practice 
Reporter 1 (April 2014). 
  
article concludes with an analysis of how planners currently use powers to achieve a variety of 
client goals for flexibility, control and tax minimization in Part 5. 
§ 1.02  The Niche of the Power of Appointment 
Application of wealth transfer tax rules depends on the rights and interests in property as recognized 
by state law.
4
  You may recall your law professor likening the concept of property to a bundle of 
sticks with each stick representing an interest in property, and later introducing the notion of a ball 
of strings with each string being tied to a stick and representing the right or power to tug on the 
stick and move it or, in other words, appoint it, in a certain manner and direction.   Interests in 
property (the proverbial sticks) include, for example, the interest or ability to use the property, 
benefit from the income earned on the property, or sell or assign the property or interest in property.  
Interests differ from rights or powers over property.  The law regarding “powers” addresses rights 
held by a person to direct the distribution and ultimate disposition of property (the proverbial 
strings) and thereby affect who may use or benefit from the underlying interests in property.
5
  
Powers may not be sold or assigned, and are personal to the holder.  This distinction between 
interests in, and powers over, property is the foundation that makes powers so useful in the design 
of trusts and other planning techniques. 
Powers are used by estate planners today to build flexibility into estate planning documents, 
particularly trusts, and in doing so to achieve certain planning goals such as family control, 
minimization of taxes and creditor protection.  Historically, meaning in the early part of the 17th 
century, powers were invented as an estate planning tool to avoid legal limitations on the transfer of 
property interests at death.
6
  Where at that time property interests could not be transferred at death, 
powers could “achieve the practical equivalent of a devise by granting the property in the owner's 
lifetime upon uses to be appointed by the owner's will.”7  It is fitting that powers continue to be a 
critical element in achieving a client’s estate planning goals.  The Internal Revenue Code, since its 
inception has recognized the differences between property interests that are transferable and powers 
of appointment granted to a person and specifically designed so as to control property within the 
limits set by the donor.  The Code, thus, subjects property interests to different rules of taxation than 
it does powers.  
While application of tax law rests on rights recognized and enforced for purposes of state law, tax 
law imposes a distinct set of rules and definitions with respect to the taxation of powers over 
property.  Gaining an understanding of the distinctions as between state law definitions and 
treatment of powers and the tax law counterparts is an important starting point.  From a planning 
perspective those distinctions prove critical for tax and creditor protection purposes.  An important 
                                                            
4 See Comm’r v. Est. of Bosch, 387 US 456 (1967). 
5 Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 17.1 cmt. c (3rd ed. 2003). 
6 Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, Scope (3rd ed. 2003). 
7 Id. 
  
aspect of the magic, if you will, in the power of appointment derives from its state law 
characteristics. 
§ 1.03  The “Magic” Conferred by State Law 
[1] Nonfiduciary Powers  
Powers of appointment allow the transferor to grant tailored powers to control underlying property 
interests without subjecting exercise of the powers to fiduciary duties.  Clients recognize the costs 
of fiduciary litigation and cringe at the possibility that the beneficiaries of their hard earned wealth 
in the end might be the litigators instead of the objects of their love and affection.  The ability to 
create legally enforceable rights and powers that avoid the prospect of breach of duty suits 
recommends use of powers of appointment.  Granting nonfiduciary powers of appointment may 
better achieve the protections provided by a trust protector or trust advisor, which under the 
Uniform Trust Code in some instances presumptively remain subject to fiduciary duties in the 
exercise of their powers.
8
 
The essence of a power of appointment is its nonfiduciary status.  The Uniform Powers of 
Appointment Act, modeled in large part after the Restatement 3d Property: Wills and Other 
Donative Transfers, specifically defines power of appointment as a “power that enables a 
powerholder acting in a nonfiduciary capacity to designate the recipient of an ownership interest in 
or another power of appointment over the appointive property.”9   Unlike the Uniform Power of 
Appointment Act, the Restatement 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, which served 
as the model for the Act, does not specifically define “power of appointment” by limiting its 
application to nonfiduciary powers,
10
 however, the comments to the Restatement indicate its 
discussion of powers of appointment generally does not apply to powers held in a fiduciary 
capacity, thereby likewise limiting application of its analysis of powers of appointment to those held 
in a nonfiduciary capacity.
11
  The nonfiduciary nature of powers of appointment substantially 
increases flexibility to control distribution of property. 
The nonfiduciary nature of the power of appointment allows the donor to effectively give the 
powerholder complete control to trump or modify trust terms by appointing to permissible 
appointees.  A power granted to family members or other persons to appoint property in trust or 
otherwise to any persons other than the powerholder or creditors of the powerholder allows the 
powerholder without constraint to shift the appointive property in any manner the powerholder 
                                                            
8 Unif. Trust Code § 808(d) (2014).  (Specifically, it provides:  “(d) A person, other than a beneficiary, who holds a 
power to direct is presumptively a fiduciary who, as such, is required to act in good faith with regard to the purposes of 
the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. The holder of a power to direct is liable for any loss that results from 
breach of a fiduciary duty.”) 
9 Unif. Power of Appointment Act § 102(13) (2013) (emphasis added). 
10 Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 17.1 (3rd ed. 2003). 
11 Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 17.1 cmt. g. (3rd ed. 2003). 
  
wishes among the broadly defined permissible appointees.  The powerholder could thereby direct 
the appointive property pursuant to a new trust with different terms for the permissible appointees, 
or could direct distributions as the powerholder sees fit among the permissible appointees regardless 
of the other dispositive terms of the trust.  Powers of appointment, thus, can avoid the need to rely 
on modification statutes or decanting statutes to affect a change in trust terms.  Powers can also 
avoid the need to grant a trust protector or trust advisor power to direct the trustee as to use of the 
trust property, which in Uniform Trust Code states at least, must be exercised by non-beneficiaries 
subject to fiduciary duties.
12
  Fiduciary duties encompass duties of loyalty and impartiality not 
inherent in the exercise of a nonfiduciary power of appointment.  The nonfiduciary nature of the 
power of appointment allows the donor to repose power in a trusted person to change beneficiaries 
and standards of distribution, and to even transfer property to an entirely new trust without 
complaint by beneficiaries or the need to seek court approval provided the exercise falls within the 
parameters of the power of appointment as designated by the donor. 
[2] Flexibility of Terms 
State law generally allows the donor of a power of appointment to draft powers as broadly or 
narrowly as donor desires.  Under state law the donor may retain the power or may grant it to 
another person.
13
  The donor may specify when the power holder can exercise the power.  A power 
of appointment may be presently exercisable, exercisable by testamentary instrument effective at 
the powerholder’s death, or postponed until the occurrence of an event or satisfaction of a 
standard.
14
  The donor may design the power to allow appointment of property outright or in further 
trust, to one or more permissible appointees and to be subject to specific conditions of exercise.  
The powerholder may have the right to specifically exclude any one or more of the permissible 
appointees from receipt of appointive property, called an exclusionary power.
15
  These broad 
parameters allow the donor to tailor the power granted based on planning goals.   
State law characterizes powers of appointment as general or nongeneral based on the type of 
permissible appointee.  General powers are those where the powerholder may appoint to herself, her 
creditors, her estate or the creditors of her estate.
16
  All other powers exercisable solely by the 
powerholder fall into the category of nongeneral powers, often referred to as “special” powers or 
“limited” powers.  Nongeneral powers may include a broad range of permissible appointees, for 
example, all persons other than the powerholder, the power holder’s estate or the creditors of either 
                                                            
12 Unif. Trust Code § 808(d) (2014).  Some states have chosen to vary the fiduciary nature of the power to direct by a 
trust advisor or trust protector. 
13Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 17.2(a), (b) (3rd ed. 2003).  See Unif. Powers of 
Appointment Act § 303(2). 
14 Unif. Powers of Appointment Act § 102(15); Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 17.4 (3rd ed. 
2003). 
15 Unif. Powers of Appointment Act § 102(5). 
16 Unif. Powers of Appointment Act § 102(6); Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 17.3 (3rd ed. 
2003). 
  
one.  They can also be more narrowly tailored both with respect to the range of permissible 
appointees and by imposition of a standard. State law also exempts certain joint powers from 
classification as general powers.
17
  The Internal Revenue Code provides favorable transfer tax 
treatment for certain nongeneral powers.  State law also provides favorable creditor protection for 
certain nongeneral powers.  The ability to obtain tax savings and creditor protection by using 
nongeneral powers tends to favor their use.  Both the tax code and the rules of the Uniform Trust 
Code also provide favorable treatment on the lapse of a general power of appointment if it does not 
trigger a taxable gift or inclusion in the gross estate. 
[3] Creditor Protection  
Not surprisingly, creditors of the powerholder under the Uniform Power of Appointment Act can 
reach the appointive property underlying a presently exercisable general power of appointment in 
light of its “ownership-equivalent” status.18 Two important exceptions to this general rule subjecting 
property underlying a general power of appointment to creditors are provided by the Uniform 
Powers of Appointment Act – one exception deals with the ability of a powerholder to distribute 
property for the powerholder’s health, education, support and maintenance,19 and, the other 
exception, with the lapse of a general power within the greatest of the amount allowed without 
triggering a taxable transfer under the Internal Revenue Code and the gift tax annual exclusion 
amount.
20
  General powers excepted are not within the reach of creditor claims under the Uniform 
Powers of Appointment Act, but notably these same exceptions are not recognized under the terms 
of the Restatement (Third) of Property and it remains to be seen whether the exceptions will be 
recognized for purposes of bankruptcy.
21
 
In contrast to general powers, the appointive property subject to nongeneral powers avoids creditors 
of the powerholder provided that the taker in default of the power is not the powerholder or the 
powerholder’s estate.22  The theory underlying this rule rests on the fact that nongeneral powers do 
not bear an “ownership-equivalent” status as is the case with general powers.  By definition the 
nongeneral power cannot be exercised for the benefit of the powerholder or powerholder’s estate, or 
creditors of either.   
Not only may creditors of the holder of a nongeneral power of appointment not reach appointive 
property, judicious use of nongeneral powers by persons who are not beneficial owners of the 
                                                            
17 See Unif. Powers of Appointment Act § 205(b); Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 17.3 cmt. 
e (3rd ed. 2003). 
18 Unif. Powers of Appointment Act § 502, Comment. 
19 Unif. Powers of Appointment Act § 502(b). 
20 Unif. Powers of Appointment Act § 503. 
21 See infra note 24. 
22Unif. Powers of Appointment Act § 504.  See also, Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 22.1 
(3rd ed. 2003) (citing similar protection provided by Section 541(b)(1) of the federal Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USC 
§ 541(b)(1)).  
  
appointive property can provide flexibility to redirect property from a beneficial owner whose 
creditors might otherwise reach the appointive property.  Nongeneral powers can be granted in such 
a manner as to allow redirection of property and the flexibility to change the rights of underlying 
beneficiaries to trust property.  The powerholder, thus, can with some foresight wrest appointive 
property from a beneficiary and as a consequence the beneficiary’s creditors. 
§ 1.04  The “Magic” Conferred by the Tax Code 
[1] Powers Taxed Separately from Property Interests 
Federal wealth transfer tax consequences of a power of appointment depend on its form and 
classification as a general power of appointment.  A general power of appointment, unlike a 
“special” or “limited” power of appointment, confers ownership-like rights to use the property for 
the powerholder’s own benefit.  Given that wealth transfer taxation depends on the economic rights 
and powers held or transferred by the decedent or donor,
23
 it is not surprising the Code recognizes 
the differences in the economic characteristics conferred by a power of appointment as opposed to 
the transfer of an interest in property.
24
  By specifically identifying the characteristics of general 
powers that cause inclusion in the gross estate or taxation as a taxable gift, Congress has provided a 
clear formula, if you will, for taxation of powers that generally avoids susceptibility to substance-
over-form arguments applicable to transfers of interests in property.
25
  The ability to draft a power 
and rely on the form specified in the Code allows for creative use of powers to achieve specific tax 
results thereby lending to the “magic” of the power of appointment. 
The Supreme Court has chosen to interpret taxing statutes based on the economic rights in and 
powers over property held or transferred by the decedent or donor, focusing on the substance as 
opposed to the form of the transfer.
26
  Property interests owned and transferred by taxpayer trigger 
application of wealth transfer taxes provisions.
27
  Although powers of appointment can impact the 
valuable economic rights associated with property interests subject to appointment, the United 
States Supreme Court has long differentiated the taxation of powers of appointment from taxation 
of interests in property.
28
  The Court in United States v. Field
29
 held that the then counterpart to IRC 
Section 2033 did not include in the gross estate that property subject to a general power of 
appointment held by the decedent on the basis that it was not a property interest includible in the 
probate estate subject to creditor claims as required by the statutory language in effect at that time.  
                                                            
23Burnet v Guggenheim, 288 US 280, 283-284 (1933); Comm'r v Estate of Church, 335 US 632, 644-45 (1949).   See 
Gagliardi, E., Economic Substance Doctrine in the Context of Federal Estate and Gift Tax:  The Internal Revenue 
Service Has It Wrong, 64 Mont L Rev 389 (2003) discussing the cited cases. 
24 Compare IRC §§ 2033 and 2035-2038 applicable to transfers of interest in property to IRC § 2041 applicable to 
powers of appointment held by persons other than the donor of the power of appointment. 
25 IRC §§ 2014, 2514. 
26Supra, note 24.  
27 IRC §§ 2033, 2501(a)(1). 
28 Supra, note 26. 
29 United States v Field, 255 US 257 (1921). 
  
In an effort to reach property subject to general powers of appointment, Congress enacted a specific 
Code section taxing the appointive property of an exercised general power of appointment.
30
   
Still struggling to include property subject to an unexercised general power of appointment, in 
Helvering v. Safe Deposit and Trust Company
31
 the Commissioner, relying on the United States 
Supreme Court’s growing focus on the substantive economic rights and interests transferred as 
opposed to the form of transfer, argued that an unexercised general power of appointment should be 
included in the gross estate under the antecedent Code Section to 2033 given the ownership-like 
rights of a general power of appointment.  Specifically, the Commissioner urged:  “at the time of his 
death the decedent had an ‘interest’ in the trust properties that should have been included in his 
gross estate, because he, to the exclusion of all other persons, could enjoy the income from them; 
would have received the corpus of one trust upon reaching the age of 28; and could alone decide to 
whom the benefits of all the trusts would pass at his death. These rights, it is said, were attributes of 
ownership substantially equivalent to a fee simple title, subject only to specified restrictions on 
alienation and the use of income.”32 The Court rejected the Commissioner’s argument on the basis 
that “viewing § 302(a) in its background of legislative, judicial, and administrative history, we 
cannot reach the conclusion that the words ‘interest . . . of the decedent at the time of his death’ 
were intended by Congress to include property subject to a general testamentary power of 
appointment unexercised by the decedent.”33  This early holding sets the stage for taxing powers of 
appointment based on the definitional provisions of Code Sections 2041 and 2514 which determine 
tax consequences based on the specific terms of the power of appointment, essentially merging form 
with substance in determining whether the power is taxable as a general power of appointment.   
[2] Terms of Power of Appointment Control 
The Code specifies the tax consequences of a power of appointment based on whether the power 
meets the tax definition for a general power of appointment.  The specific terms or, in other words, 
“form” of the power of appointment determines whether appointive property is subject to estate or 
gift tax.  Powers of appointment do not “impliedly” arise in a person.  State law generally provides 
that powers of appointment must be transferred to the powerholder by the owner of the appointive 
property,
34
 and “[i]n order for a transfer to be effective, it must be properly executed….”35  The 
economic substance of a power of appointment granted by a donor, thus, derives by definition from 
its terms as specified in the document governing the transferred property.
36
 
                                                            
30 See IRC § 2041(a)(1); Act of February 24, 1919, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1096, 1149 (changing language of Code 
addressed by the Court in US v Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921). 
31 Helvering v Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 US 56, 58 (1942). 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 59. 
34 Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 18.1 (3rd ed. 2003). 
35 Restat 3d Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 18.1 cmt. a (3rd ed. 2003). 
36 IRC §§ 2041, 2514. 
  
 
[a] Third Party Powers Differentiated from Retained Powers 
Unlike state law, Treasury regulations differentiate powers of appointment taxable pursuant to Code 
sections 2041 and 2514, from powers retained by the donor and taxable under other Code sections.  
The regulations specify:  “[T]he term ‘power of appointment’ does not include powers reserved by 
the decedent to himself within the concept of sections 2036 to 2038.”37  Thus, unlike state law, 
retained powers for purposes of the Code are not referred to or taxed as “powers of appointment.”  
The substantive focus in determining how to tax a power is on whether the powerholder is someone 
other than the donor of the power.  If it is a third party powerholder, then the distinguishing factor 
for tax purposes becomes whether the power of appointment is general or special based on its terms. 
A determination of whether a power is a retained power or one taxed as a power of appointment 
does depend, in the first instance, on a substantive analysis of the economic realities.  The 
substantive analysis is used to determine the transferor for purposes of applying estate and gift tax 
rules and derives from the holding of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Estate of 
Grace.
38
  In Grace, the Court employed the reciprocal trust doctrine to uncross trusts created by 
spouses in order to determine in substance the identity of the transferor for purposes of applying the 
estate tax provisions to the trust property.  The Court uncrossed essentially mirror image trusts 
created by spouses upon a finding that the creation of the respective trusts was interrelated and left 
the transferors to the extent of mutual value in similar economic positions following the transfers.  
Upon uncrossing the trusts, decedent was deemed the transferor of the trust over which he held a 
retained income interest and the value of the underlying property, thus, was included in his gross 
estate.
39
  The Grace Court addressed retention of reciprocal interests in property and did not address 
retention of reciprocal powers. 
The lower courts are divided as to whether the reciprocal trust doctrine should extend to a 
determination of whether a power of appointment has been created or whether instead a power has 
merely been retained by the donor of the underlying property.  The Sixth Circuit in Green v. United 
States
40
 narrowly construed the holding of Grace and declined to apply the reciprocal trust doctrine 
in analyzing mirror image powers over trust property granted by spouses to each other.  By 
choosing to limit Grace to application of reciprocal property interests, the Sixth Circuit holding 
effectively resulted in the powers being classified as limited powers of appointment with respect to 
each spouse, thereby avoiding inclusion in the gross estate that would have resulted if the powers 
had been classified as retained powers.  In contrast to the Sixth Circuit holding in Green, the Tax 
Court in Bischoff v. Commissioner
41
 applied the reciprocal trust doctrine to powers in order to 
determine if the powers should be treated as the economic equivalent of retained powers as opposed 
to powers of appointment.  The Tax Court reasoned that a failure to delve into a substantive analysis 
                                                            
37 Treas Reg § 20.2041-1(b)(2).  See also Treas Reg § 25.2514-1(b)(2). 
38 US v Estate of Grace, 395 US 316 (1969). 
39 Id. 
40 Green v. US, 68 F3d 151(6th Cir 1995). 
41 Bischoff v Comm’r, 69 TC 32 (1977). 
  
in favor of form would create a loophole in the taxing statutes.
42
  It applied the reciprocal trust 
doctrine to powers by asking: (1) whether the transfers were interrelated and (2) whether the powers 
would have been taxed absent the reciprocal technique.  The Federal Circuit has followed the 
holding of the Tax Court in Bischoff.
43
  The initial determination of whether the power should be 
classified as a power of appointment and taxed under Code sections 2041 and 2514, thus, is likely to 
be subject to a substance over form analysis.  Once a determination is made that the power is a 
power of appointment, as opposed to a retained power, the terms of the power control its 
classification as a general power of appointment. 
    
[b] Nomenclature Irrelevant 
 
In classifying powers, the Treasury Regulations also reject any reliance on the nomenclature used in 
referring to a power.  Interestingly the Service in a recent ruling addresses what the trust calls a 
“Testamentary Limited Power of Appointment” that is in fact retained by the donor.  The ruling 
correctly refrains from analyzing such retained power under Code section 2514 simply because of 
the name assigned by the trust terms, and instead analyzes the power as one retained by donor.
44
  
The fact that the trust calls the retained power a “limited power” does not exempt the underlying 
appointive property from taxation in the hands of the donor.  Appropriately “nomenclature” does 
not control tax consequences.  The “substance and effect” of the power controls, meaning that a 
power “to consume” or “to affect beneficial enjoyment” of property interests held by a person other 
than the donor of the power, is a “power of appointment.”45  
 
Not only does the name given to a power not control, but a failure to acknowledge a power as a 
power of appointment becomes irrelevant.  Treasury regulations explain that the terms of a trust 
document may grant a power of appointment without calling it a power.
46
  The regulations explain 
by example that a trust provision allowing the beneficiary to control consumption of trust property 
is a power of appointment regardless of whether the trust instrument uses the word “power.”47  At 
the same time the regulations indicate the grant of a “power” over management of the trust assets 
that does not allow the powerholder to shift beneficial interest is not a power of appointment 
regardless of the reference to a power granted.
48
  It is the legal right to impact beneficial enjoyment 
of underlying trust property granted to the powerholder by another that is a power of appointment 
for purposes of the federal estate and gift tax. 
 
[c] Classification as a General Power 
 
If the terms of a post-October 21, 1942 power of appointment allow for its exercise “in favor of the 
[powerholder], his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate”49 the power is classified as a 
general power of appointment, and if held by the powerholder at death is includible in the gross 
                                                            
42 Id. at 48. 
43 Exchange Bank and Tr. Co. of Florida v US, 694 F2d 1261, 1269 (Fed Cir 1982). 
44 PLR 201507008. 
45 Treas Reg § 20.2041-1(b)(1).  See also Treas Reg § 25.2514-1(b)(1) 
46 Id 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 IRC §§ 2041(b)(1), 2514(c). 
  
estate of the powerholder whether or not exercised, unless it falls within a specified exception.
50
  
Specifically excepted from the definition of post-October 21, 1942 general powers of appointment 
are those powers limited by an ascertainable standard relating to health, maintenance, education and 
support and exercisable in favor of the powerholder.
51
  Also excepted are certain joint powers, 
including those exercisable only with the consent of the donor of the power, those exercisable only 
with a person holding a substantial adverse interest in the appointive property, and a portion of other 
jointly held powers not falling within one of the other exceptions applicable to joint powers.
52
  To 
the extent the terms of the power granted to the powerholder by the donor do not meet the Code 
definition of general power of appointment, the power is deemed a “special” or a “limited” power 
and avoids taxation in the hands of the powerholder.  Special rules also exempt from taxation 
certain “lapses” of a general power of appointment.53  The wealth transfer taxation of powers of 
appointment, thus, depends on the terms or, in other words, form of the power meeting the 
definitional requirements of the Code.   
 
Given the manner in which the Code specifically differentiates as between the transfer of property 
interests and the taxation of property subject to a power of appointment, and how it also 
differentiates as between powers retained by the donor and powers of appointment held by persons 
other than the donor, it makes sense that the substance over form doctrines employed by courts to 
transfers of property interests and retained powers over such property, on the one hand, would not 
similarly apply to powers of appointment, on the other.  The question that arises when the donor 
transfers an interest in property is whether the donor has transferred all interests and control over 
the transferred property, or whether the donor has explicitly or implicitly retained valuable 
economic rights over the transferred property that would cause inclusion in the donor’s gross estate 
pursuant to Code sections 2036 or 2038.
54
  To determine if there has been an implicit retention, 
courts generally look to objective factors, such as the subsequent actions of the donor indicating an 
implied retention of economic interest by the donor.
55
  Unlike retained powers over property 
previously owned by the donor, powers of appointment must be granted to a person other than the 
donor per the terms of the instrument of transfer in a manner that would allow recognition of the 
power under state law.
56
 For that reason the notion of an implied retention of an economic right 
cannot arise as to powers of appointment.  The extent of the power granted and its legal 
enforceability derives solely from the terms of the instrument of transfer.  The question, however, 
becomes whether an implied agreement will be recognized to deny the terms of the power and its 
existence. 
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[d] Inability to Ignore Terms of Power of Appointment 
 
Consonant with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Commissioner v. Estate of Noel57 that 
ruled legally enforceable rights set forth in an insurance contract defined economic substance for 
purposes of determining estate tax consequences, the courts in addressing powers of appointment 
also focus on the legally enforceable rights granted by the terms of the power of appointment.  
Despite the fact that in a long line of cases addressing Crummey withdrawal rights the courts have 
acknowledged the possibility of overlaying a substance over form analysis based on implied or 
express agreement to determine ultimate tax consequences, the courts to date have consistently 
refused to find such an agreement exists that would override the legally enforceable rights granted 
by the terms of the power of appointment.  
Donors often use what have come to be known as Crummey withdrawal powers, which are general 
powers of appointment exercisable during a limited period of time, to make present interest gifts for 
purposes of obtaining an annual exclusion.  Whether or not a present interest in the appointive 
property has been granted to the donee-powerholder depends on whether the powerholder in 
substance holds a general power of appointment.  The Ninth Circuit in Crummey v. Commissioner
58
 
rejected the Service’s argument that extrinsic circumstances and factors could be relied on to 
determine whether or not the powerholder has a general power of appointment.
59
 Instead the court 
focused on the terms of the power of appointment specifically allowing “the child’s guardian [to] 
make [] demand on behalf of the child.”60  The Ninth Circuit emphasized that it did not matter 
whether or not the demand will likely be exercised, but confirmed that the focus should be on 
whether the demand could in fact legally be exercised on behalf of the minor.
61
  The court, thus, 
recognized that legal rights granted by the general power of appointment controlled tax 
implications. 
The Internal Revenue Service attempted to distinguish the holding of Crummey in Estate of 
Cristofani v. Commissioner
62
 on the basis that the contingent interests of grandchildren in the trust 
precludes a finding that the grandchildren received a present interest based on the withdrawal rights 
granted by the trust instrument.  The Tax Court reaffirmed the focus on the terms of the legally 
enforceable rights in determining tax consequences: 
As discussed in Crummey, the likelihood that the beneficiary will actually receive 
present enjoyment of the property is not the test for determining whether a present 
interest was received.  Rather, we must examine the ability of the beneficiaries, in a 
                                                            
57 Comm’r v Est of Noel, 280 US 678 (1965). 
58 Crummey v Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir 1968). 
59 Id. at 89 (the court declined to adopt the holding of Stifel v Comm’r, 197 F2d 107 (2d Cir 1952)). 
60 Id. at 83. 
61 Id. at 87. 
62 97 TC 74 (1991). 
  
legal sense, to exercise their right to withdraw trust corpus, and the trustee’s right to 
legally resist a beneficiary’s demand for payment. … Based upon the language of the 
trust instrument and stipulations of the parties, we believe that each grandchild 
possessed the legal right to withdraw trust corpus and that the trustees would be 
unable to legally resist a grandchild’s withdrawal demand.  We note that there was 
not agreement or understanding between decedent, the trustees, and the beneficiaries 
that the grandchildren would not exercise their withdrawal rights following a 
contribution to the [ ] Trust.
63
 
By leaving open the possibility that an agreement or understanding among the parties could imply 
that the terms of the withdrawal right could be ignored in determining tax consequences, the Tax 
Court encouraged the Service to search for a case that would cause the court to find such an 
agreement.   
Shortly after the Tax Court’s decision in Cristofani the Service made two additional attempts at 
invoking a substance over form doctrine in interpreting the legal rights granted pursuant to the terms 
of the withdrawal right.  In both attempts the Service failed.  In both cases, Estate of Kohlsaat v. 
Commissioner
64
 and Estate of Holland v. Commissioner,
65
 the Tax Court issued memorandum 
decisions substantially limiting the possibility that a court would imply an understanding among the 
powerholder and the donor in a manner so as to limit the legally enforceable rights granted by the 
general power of appointment. 
In Kohlsaat, the tax court rejected the Service’s argument that “understandings existed between 
decedent and the 16 contingent beneficiaries of decedent’s trust to the effect that the beneficiaries 
would not exercise their rights to demand distributions of trust property, that these understandings 
negate decedent’s donative intent, and the substance-over-form doctrine should apply to deny the 
annual gift tax exclusions….”66  The court explained:  “the fact that none of the beneficiaries 
exercised their rights or that none of the beneficiaries requested notification of future transfers of 
property to the trust does not imply to us that the beneficiaries had agreed with decedent not to do 
so, and we refuse to infer any understanding.”67  The Tax Court’s refusal to “infer” an 
understanding from a nonexercise of a power or even from a lack of notification to the powerholder 
limits substantially the ability of the Service to ignore the legal rights granted by the terms of a 
power of appointment based on a substance over form analysis. 
The facts of Holland came closest to demonstrating an agreement not to exercise.  Testimony 
showed that decedent and the children, who were granted the withdrawal rights, “discussed how the 
gifts were to be used prior to decedent’s taking out the loan or making the gifts. …  The donees 
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unanimously agreed to pool their gifts in order to realize a greater return on their investments.”  
Based on this agreement money transferred subject to the children’s withdrawal rights was used to 
purchase certificates of deposit paying a favorable interest rate.  In responding to the 
Commissioner’s argument, the Tax Court stated:  “There is no evidence to support a finding that the 
donee’s legal ability to demand payment from the trustees was limited by their informal agreement 
to purchase a CD after the gifts were made.  Nor is there any evidence that decedent would not have 
made the gifts to any donee who did not agree to invest rather than spend the gift.”68  The Tax 
Court’s response results in an almost impossibly high hurdle for showing an implied agreement that 
overcomes the legally enforceable terms of a withdrawal right granting a general power of 
appointment.  
The Tax Court again in 2015 reaffirms its earlier holdings in Mikel v. Commissioner
69
 and upholds 
annual exclusion gifts of $1,440,000 to a trust pursuant to Crummey withdrawal rights granted to 
each of 60 beneficiaries.  The terms of the trust also included an interrorem clause eliminating the 
interest of any beneficiary who questions the distribution decisions of the trustee and further 
required any dispute to be resolved by a “beth din.”  In Mikel the Service argues the withdrawal 
rights were illusory.  The court notes:  “Respondent concedes that the [trust] affords each 
beneficiary an unconditional right of withdrawal and suggests no colorable basis on which the 
trustees could properly refuse to honor a timely withdrawal demand.  Respondent nevertheless 
contends that the beneficiaries did not receive a ‘present interest in property’ because their rights of 
withdrawal were not ‘legally enforceable’ in practical terms. According to respondent, a right of 
withdrawal is ‘legally enforceable’ only if the beneficiary can ‘go before a state court to enforce 
that right.’”70  The court upholds the withdrawal rights.  It finds the rights can be legally enforced 
before the beth din, and that properly construed the in terrorem clause does not preclude a 
beneficiary’s enforcement of the withdrawal right in state court.  The court in Mikel once again 
rebuffs the Service’s substance-over-form argument. Mikel demonstrates that the use of general 
powers of appointment can create rights in a targeted manner to achieve a specific tax result, here 
the ability to obtain multiple annual exclusions despite the fact that the underlying property interests 
remain under the discretionary control of a trustee. 
[3] Terms Imbue Economic Substance  
The fact that state law allows flexibility in the design of powers means that the terms of a power of 
appointment may be tailored to achieve a variety of tax results.  Tax results depend on whether the 
power is held in a fiduciary or nonfiduciary matter,
71
 whether at the time of transfer the 
powerholder “has” the power,72 and who may receive appointed property.73  State law conveniently 
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allows the donor of the power to specify each of these characteristics. The terms of the power may 
specify when the powerholder may exercise the power, to whom the property may be appointed, 
how the property may be appointed (whether in further trust, subject to a standard or subject to a 
condition), and who takes in the event the powerholder fails to appoint.
74
  This flexibility allows the 
estate planner to creatively design legally enforceable economic rights to control tax consequences. 
In determining whether a power of appointment meets the definition of a general power, courts 
analyze whether the power granted to the powerholder in substance allows the powerholder to 
appoint property to herself, her creditors, her estate or the creditors of her estate.   Courts 
acknowledge that the terms of the power control whether in fact the powerholder has a power and 
what powers or, in other words, what economic rights have been granted.  In designing the power of 
appointment the estate planner must keep in mind whether the terms create the substantive 
economic rights desired. 
The courts determine the tax consequences of powers based on the scope of the control in fact 
granted to the powerholder.  For example, in Estate of Kurz v. Commissioner
75
  the powerholder 
held a general power over a marital trust for the purpose of obtaining a marital deduction, and, in 
addition, held a power to appoint five percent of the property of the credit shelter trust on the 
condition that the assets of the marital trust were exhausted.  In determining whether the 
powerholder had a general power of appointment over the credit shelter trust at her death that would 
result in inclusion of five percent of the trust assets in her estate, the court looked at the economic 
substance of the contingency.  The court reasoned:  “If only a lever must be pulled to dispense 
money, then the power is exercisable.  The funds are effectively under the control of the 
[powerholder], which is enough to put them into the gross estate.  Whether the lever is a single-
clutch or double-clutch mechanism can’t matter.”76  In focusing on the substantive economic rights 
held by the powerholder, the court specifically rejected the Tax Court’s reasoning that the condition 
should be disregarded if it lacks any “significant non-tax consequence independent of the 
decedent’s ability to exercise the power.”77  The Kurz holding clarifies that the economic rights to 
control provided by the specific terms of the power are determinative, and will not be tested based 
on a taxpayer’s tax or non-tax motives or other implied understandings. 
In designing powers to target a specific tax consequence, the terms of the power must grant 
enforceable economic rights consonant with those required to trigger the specified tax result.  For 
example, in Private Letter Ruling 201544002 the terms of the powers, both retained powers and 
powers of appointment ensured grantor trust status for income tax purposes during the lives of both 
grantors and a step-up in basis on the respective deaths of the grantors.  The retained power to 
revoke transfers to the spouse’s respective shares of the trust results in grantor trust characterization, 
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and the general power of appointment over the marital trust results in a step-up in basis on the death 
of the surviving spouse provided the power is exercised.  In issuing the private letter ruling the 
service recognizes the enforceable legal rights granted by the powers and acknowledges that tax 
consequences follow those rights. 
§ 1.05  Using Powers to Achieve Client Goals   
[1] Identifying Client Goals 
While the desire of clients to minimize tax often provides the impetus to schedule an appointment 
with an estate planner, the typical client will also indicate a desire to accomplish other goals as well.  
Of concern to many clients is the desire to ensure certain beneficiaries ultimately receive the use 
and benefit of their hard earned assets and to protect those assets from creditor claims.  Within these 
broad goals, clients typically want to provide a certain amount of flexibility to adapt to the changing 
needs and circumstances of beneficiaries.  Powers of appointment can assist clients in achieving 
these goals.   
[2] Minimizing Tax  
Powers of appointment can be designed to achieve specific tax consequences.  General powers of 
appointment typically cause inclusion of the appointive property in the gross estate at death or, if 
exercised during life, a gift on transfer of the appointive property during life.
78
  As a result, if the 
transfer is to a skip person, the general power of appointment may also cause a generation skipping 
transfer.
79
  For purposes of determining income tax consequences, a general power of appointment, 
in some instances may cause the trust to be treated as a grantor trust with respect to the powerholder 
for income tax purposes.
80
  If the goal is to shelter the appointive property from transfer tax and 
from the possibility of taxation on trust income in the hands of the powerholder, planners generally 
should avoid using general powers of appointment in favor of limited powers of appointment, also 
referred to as special powers or, under state law, nongeneral powers.       
Limited powers of appointment generally do not trigger gross estate inclusion or a taxable gift on 
exercise.  The broadest limited power or appointment would allow the powerholder to appoint to 
anyone other than the powerholder, the powerholder’s estate or the creditors of either. The 
powerholder does have flexibility to control and limit the class of permissible appointees.
81
  The 
client can specify a more limited class, such as descendants, and thereby ensure the appointive 
property ultimately benefits family members. The major drawback of a limited power is that the 
powerholder cannot benefit herself in the exercise of the power unless discretion to do so is limited 
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by an ascertainable standard.
82
  In addition, the holder of a limited power of appointment may not 
use property to satisfy an obligation of support owed by the powerholder as such discretion would 
cause the power to be classified as a general power of appointment.
83
  Another major drawback to 
the lifetime exercise of a limited power of appointment arises when, in conjunction with the power 
of appointment, the powerholder has a mandatory income interest in the appointive property.  In 
that event, on exercise of the limited power of appointment, the powerholder would also be deemed 
to make a gift of the income interest.
84
  A grant of a testamentary limited power of appointment, 
however, could avoid this result.  Despite the limitations associated with a limited power, a limited 
power of appointment can provide substantial flexibility to direct use of the appointive property 
without triggering a transfer tax or adverse income tax consequences. 
It is possible in limited circumstances to grant a powerholder the ability to appoint property to 
herself and at the same time avoid triggering transfer tax.  The powerholder may allow a general 
power of appointment to lapse without triggering transfer tax provided the property that could have 
been appointed did not exceed in value the greater of $5,000 or 5 percent of the aggregate value of 
the property out of which the exercise of the lapsed power could have been satisfied.
85
   It is for this 
reason that many planners feel most comfortable limiting Crummey withdrawal rights to what is 
referred to as a “5 and 5” power, picking up on the statutory limits for a transfer tax free lapse.  
Creative use of the lapsing general power of appointment can provide opportunity to the 
powerholder to decide whether or not to withdraw trust assets for her own use without needing to 
rely on the exercise of discretion by a trustee and without concern of other fiduciary duties the 
trustee may owe.  For example, a power may be designed so that the powerholder can annually 
appoint to herself up to the greater of (i) $5,000 and (ii) 5 percent of the trust property on the date 
that is January 5 of each year, with the power lapsing on that date if not exercised.  If in this 
example the trust held $5 million in assets, the powerholder could annually withdraw up to 
$250,000 or, alternatively, could allow the power to lapse leaving the property in trust without gift 
tax consequence to the powerholder.  Unless the powerholder dies on January 5, there also would be 
no inclusion in the transferor’s gross estate.86  The benefit and at the same time the drawback 
depending on the donor’s desires in this example is that the powerholder can use the appointive 
property for whatever purpose she wants, and to the extent of the general power granted, the donor 
of the power of appointment effectively gives up direction and control over the appointive property 
much in the same way as if the donor had made an outright gift.  The exception to transfer taxation 
for lapsing powers is limited by the $5,000 and 5 percent rule.  Lapse of a general power of 
appointment in excess of these “5 and 5” limits, would trigger a taxable gift and likely inclusion in 
the gross estate to the extent of the proportionate value of the trust property associated with the 
lapsed general powers of appointment.   
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Jointly held powers if properly designed can also allow appointment of property to the powerholder 
without triggering a taxable gift or inclusion in the gross estate.  For example, a power held jointly 
with the donor of the power would avoid triggering gift tax on exercise of the power or estate tax on 
the death of the joint powerholder.
87
   It is important to keep in mind, however, that the donor of the 
power, as contrasted from the powerholder, would be subject to gift tax and estate tax inclusion.
88
  
In addition, estate and gift tax may be avoided in the event a power can be exercised only with 
consent of a person holding a substantial adverse interest.
89
  Carefully crafted jointly held powers, 
thus, can allow family members discretionary authority to control use of trust property and to 
benefit themselves if they so desire.
90
 
Use of powers of appointment that avoid unfavorable transfer tax consequences can also achieve 
other common tax goals of clients including the flexibility to adapt to unexpected circumstances, the 
ability to preserve a semblance of control in the hands of family members or beneficiaries, and the 
possibility of avoiding appropriation of trust property by a beneficiary’s or powerholder’s creditors.  
The choice of whether to use a limited power of appointment, a special power subject to an 
ascertainable standard or a jointly held power depends on both tax goals and other planning goals of 
the client, such as creditor protection. 
[3] Flexibility to Control or Modify Trust Provisions  
The drafters of the first Restatement of Property, written almost a century ago, recognizing the need 
for flexibility of trust provisions eloquently stated:  
Owners often wish to control the devolution of their property through two or more 
generations; and the rule against perpetuities does not prevent an owner who is 
competently advised from exercising such control for about a century. Plainly no 
human foresight is adequate to frame in advance dispositions which will meet the 
exigencies of the maximum period of control…. Births and deaths in varying 
combinations, the commercial success of some family members and the failure of 
others, the varying capacities of individuals as to the husbanding of resources, 
fluctuation in income returns and the value of the monetary unit, legislative action 
and constitutional amendment reflecting social and political change -- all these are 
factors whose unpredictability indicates the folly of rigid predetermined future 
limitations and the desirability of gifts containing a substantial element of flexibility. 
The power of appointment, particularly the special power, is the most efficient 
device yet contrived by which an owner may obtain such flexibility while still 
controlling the general purposes to which his property shall be devoted. When A 
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leaves his property in trust for his son, B, for life and then in trust for such children 
of B as B shall by will appoint, he makes it possible for the manner of distribution 
among B's children to be determined in accordance with the changes which may 
occur during the rest of B's life while at the same time ensuring that the remainder 
interest will not be diverted from the children. In a sense the power of appointment 
extends the personality of A through the balance of the life of B.
91
 
This statement proves even truer today as many states have chosen to either extend or eliminate any 
limit historically imposed by the rule against perpetuities.
92
  In the current environment, providing 
opportunity to modify trust terms proves important as evidenced by the efforts undertaken by states 
to enact decanting statutes
93
 and be estate planners to provide for use of trust advisors and trust 
protectors.
94
 
Absent use of a nonfiduciary power of appointment, other methods for modification or reformation 
of a trust typically require court approval or require the person undertaking the modification to act 
subject to fiduciary constraints.  Traditionally, courts may modify a trust based on whether the 
modification comports with the material purposes of a trust.
95
  Undertaking modification requires 
incurring those expenses involved in petitioning the court, including in some circumstances the 
expenses associated with appointment of a guardian ad litem for unborn beneficiaries.  Decanting 
statutes typically require trustees to act in conformance with trust purposes and fiduciary standards.  
The Uniform Trust Decanting Act specifically indicates that the power to decant is a “fiduciary” 
power, and must be exercised in accord with fiduciary duties, although the act provides that the 
trustee who holds the power to decant is not subject to a duty to exercise it.
96
   Imposition of 
fiduciary duties can have a chilling effect on the exercise of the power, especially when the trustee 
can avoid imposition of those duties simply by choosing not to decant.  Given the potential costs 
associated with trust modification or decanting, planners have chosen to proactively grant powers of 
appointment to modify or terminate trusts.  
As the law has developed, both trust protectors and trust advisors also may be subject to fiduciary 
duties unless the terms of the trust direct otherwise.  The Uniform Trust Code acknowledges the 
growing use of trust protectors and trust advisers.  It describes these roles as follows:  “’Advisers’ 
have long been used for certain trustee functions, such as the power to direct investments or manage 
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a closely-held business. ‘Trust protector,’ a term largely associated with offshore trust practice, is 
more recent and usually connotes the grant of greater powers, sometimes including the power to 
amend or terminate the trust.”97   The Uniform Trust Code presumes trust advisors and trust 
protectors, who are not also trust beneficiaries, act subject to fiduciary duties.
98
  In addition, it 
specifically provides:  “The holder of a power to direct is liable for any loss that results.”99  
Essentially the Uniform Trust Code presumes any power of appointment to modify trust terms 
granted to a non-beneficiary is a fiduciary power.  The purpose is to ensure that the non-beneficiary 
is duty bound to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries.  Granting powers to a non-beneficiary 
allows the greatest flexibility to adapt to changed circumstances and upon modification to provide 
for all beneficiaries.   The trust, by its terms, can specifically eliminate the fiduciary presumption 
and state that the trust advisor or protector holds a nonfiduciary power and can likewise eliminate 
any liability for loss.  In eliminating fiduciary duties, the difficulty, however, is to choose someone 
who innately will act in the best interests of the beneficiaries. Naming a beneficiary as trust 
protector or trust advisor generally requires use of a limited power of appointment in order to avoid 
adverse transfer tax consequences in the hands of that beneficiary, and a limited power of 
appointment by its nature limits ability of the beneficiary to benefit herself or the persons to whom 
she owes a duty of support.  Despite the trade-offs, the granting of nonfiduciary powers of 
appointment can accomplish modification of trust terms with fewer costs and less hesitation.  A nice 
compromise exists in using a combination of powers – naming a trust protector who is not a 
beneficiary and who is subject to duties in the exercise of the modification powers, and granting a 
nonfiduciary limited power of appointment to a trusted beneficiary who is typically a family 
member.  Use of multiple powers can provide substantial flexibility in how and when to modify 
trust provisions. 
Carefully crafted joint powers of appointment provide an option for overcoming the limitations 
associated with limited power of appointment held by a trust beneficiary.  Joint powers can allow 
the joint powerholders to exercise the power in a manner that benefits them without causing the 
power to be treated as a general power of appointment for transfer tax purposes.  In recent private 
letter rulings joint powers have been used to place discretionary control in the hands of family 
members.
100
  In this way, among others, the donor of the power can be assured that those persons 
who are the ultimate intended beneficiaries of the donor’s bounty in fact have control to make 
distributions, and as a result modification of trust terms, in the manner they deem most appropriate.  
In addition exercise of the jointly held power by trust beneficiaries is not subject to any fiduciary 
duties.   
For a jointly held power not to be treated as a general power of appointment, the power must be 
held either with the grantor or with a beneficiary who has a substantial adverse interest.  The jointly 
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held powers in the private letter rulings is patterned after the example in the Treasury Regulations 
where the substantial adverse interest arises as a result of a continued power in other joint 
powerholders to distribute property among themselves.
101
  The ruling specifically references:   
A taker in default of appointment under a power has an interest which is adverse to 
an exercise of the power. A co-holder of the power has no adverse interest merely 
because of his joint possession of the power nor merely because he is a permissible 
appointee under a power. However, a co-holder of a power is considered as having 
an adverse interest where he may possess the power after the decedent's death and 
may exercise it at that time in favor of himself, his estate, his creditors, or the 
creditors of his estate. Thus, for example, if X, Y, and Z held a power jointly to 
appoint among a group of persons which includes themselves and if on the death of 
X the power will pass to Y and Z jointly, then Y and Z are considered to have 
interests adverse to the exercise of the power in favor of X. Similarly, if on Y's death 
the power will pass to Z, Z is considered to have an interest adverse to the exercise 
of the power in favor of Y.
102
   
It then draws comparison to the joint power held by an “Approval Committee” composed of the 
decedent’s four children who are the primary beneficiaries of four separate trusts: 
In this case, the Approval Committee is composed of only Grantor's four children. 
With respect to each of the Children's Trusts, the Approval Committee has broad 
powers to amend the trust, to alter distributions made by the distribution trustee, and 
to make distributions from the trusts. While the Approval Committee is acting, no 
funds can be distributed from any trust without the Approval Committee's consent.  
We conclude, therefore, that the members of the Approval Committee have interests 
that are adverse to the other members. Because every distribution is subject to 
Approval Committee consent, including the default allocations provided under the 
terms of Trust A, the Approval Committee is empowered to prevent all distributions 
from all of Children's Trusts 1 through 4. After Date 2, the Approval Committee has 
a jointly-held overriding power of appointment to appoint to any person or 
organization, including themselves. On the death of one child of Grantor, the power 
will pass jointly to the surviving three children of Grantor. Thus, as in the example in 
§ 20.2041-3(c)(2), the surviving three children are considered to have interests 
adverse to the exercise of the power of the deceased child.
103
 
Although the Service issues a limited ruling, it is a favorable one holding that the jointly held 
powers of the “Approval Committee” are not general powers of appointment so long as at least two 
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children serve on the committee.  The difficulty emerges in that for the power not to be general 
there must be at least two children serving on the “Approval Committee.”104   
In a later ruling, similar jointly held powers, when used in tandem with joint powers held with trust 
grantors, achieved the targeted tax consequences sought when constructing a DING or NING trust, 
specifically nongrantor trust status, incomplete gift by the donor on creation, and a step-up in basis 
for trust assets on the grantor’s death, and, in addition, the joint powers were determined to not be 
general powers of appointment.
105
  While technically difficult to draft, jointly held powers allow 
donors to place control and flexibility over trust assets in the hands of their children and still afford 
the possibility of the children exercising the jointly held powers to benefit themselves.  Use of 
jointly held powers, thus, can accomplish the typical client estate planning goals – targeted tax 
savings, family control, flexibility to modify, and the ability to protect against creditor claims.  They 
can also be used to achieve state income tax savings as demonstrated by the NING and DING 
rulings discussed below. 
[4] Flexibility to Control Behavior 
Powers of appointment effectively grant control over property to the person or persons designated 
as the powerholder.  The client should carefully choose who it is that should have control and also 
should consider the appropriate scope of the control granted.  Persons holding a power of 
appointment in a nonfiduciary capacity have complete discretion to direct property to and among 
the permissible appointees unless the terms otherwise indicate.  By granting a power of 
appointment, the client essentially shifts control over the property to the powerholder.  This shift in 
control can impact relationships as between the powerholder and the permissible donees and takers 
in default in intended and unintended ways. 
Powers can be used to encourage better behavior from the point of view of the powerholder.  For 
example, by granting the surviving spouse a power of appointment, the spouse may be able to exert 
greater influence over the couple’s children.  In a second marriage situation a limited power of 
appointment may encourage a more civil interaction going forward as between the spouse and the 
children from a prior marriage.  Limiting permissible beneficiaries to the client’s descendants, 
however, ensures that at least one of client’s descendants will eventually benefit from the appointive 
property and eliminates the possibility of a non-family member being the ultimate beneficiary of the 
client’s assets in the event the powerholder becomes upset at one or all of the permissible appointee 
children. Judicious use of limited powers of appointment can result in some instances in keeping the 
peace and at the same time not triggering unwanted tax consequences. 
Jointly held powers can also impact behavior.  Joint powers can cause children who are joint 
powerholders to begin working as a team.  Those powers, however, can also have the unintended 
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consequence of bringing children to a stalemate when unanimity is required and one child simply 
refuses to get on board.  Nevertheless, teamwork typically yields better financial results for all, and 
in that way encourages siblings to work in a mutually beneficial manner. 
[5] Achieving Targeted Tax Results 
Carefully crafted powers can assist in achieving targeted tax results.  By exploiting differences in 
the income, estate and gift tax treatment of powers, specific tax consequences can be garnered.  For 
example, in some instances a client may wish to create a trust that causes the donor to be taxed on 
the income of the trust, and yet is not included in the grantor’s estate for estate tax purposes.  Other 
clients may prefer to ensure that the income is taxed to the trust and trust beneficiaries, but that the 
underlying trust assets be included in the client’s gross estate.  The ability to grant powers of 
appointment in such a way that the terms of the power create legally enforceable rights so as to 
trigger or avoid income, estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer tax consequences make powers 
of appointment an invaluable estate planning tool.  Deciding how to draft the powers of 
appointment necessary to achieve the targeted tax result also requires a careful weighing of the shift 
in control caused when a nonfiduciary power is granted. 
The intentionally defective grantor trust or IDGT, which gained status as a common planning 
technique at a time when the applicable exclusion amount was relatively low and impacted many 
more taxpayers, relies on careful crafting of powers to achieve its tax minimization goals.  The goal 
of the so-called IDGT is to cause the trust to be treated as a grantor trust for income tax purposes, 
and yet at the same time cause the transfer to be a completed gift and the assets subject to transfer 
excluded from grantor’s gross estate.  Thus, the reference to “defective” grantor trust alludes to the 
fact that this combination of tax attributes historically was not considered optimal.  Yet by using an 
IDGT a client who wishes to decrease the value of her gross estate and at the same time benefit the 
trust beneficiaries can make the equivalent of a tax free transfer simply by structuring the trust as a 
grantor trust and remaining legally obligated to pay income tax on earnings of the trust assets.  A 
similar technique is used in what has become known as the “super-charged” credit shelter trust.106  
Additional planning benefits also accrue from creation of a grantor trust, including the ability of the 
grantor to “sell” assets to the trust and not trigger gain on those assets.107  It is notable, however, 
that the Service currently refuses to issue any ruling as to whether or not assets held in a grantor 
trust and not includible in a grantor’s gross estate will receive a step up in basis for income tax 
purposes.
108
  If in fact it is concluded that basis is adjusted under I.R.C. Section 1014, this planning 
technique may become even more popular.   
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The ability to obtain grantor trust treatment and at the same time escape inclusion in the gross estate 
derives from use of powers that trigger grantor trust treatment, but which do not trigger inclusion of 
assets in the gross estate.   Retention of a nonfiduciary swap power whereby the grantor of a trust 
retains a power to “reacquire the trust corpus by substituting other property of an equivalent value” 
causes the trust to be a grantor trust for income tax purposes.
109
  In the rulings, however, the Service 
implies that a facts and circumstances test will apply to determine if in fact a power is held in a 
nonfiduciary capacity.  In this respect the Service raises the specter of a form or substance doctrine 
in the income tax context that is inapplicable to powers in the estate and gift tax context, as 
discussed above, as the terms of the power control for estate and gift tax and set the legally 
enforceable rights, including whether it is fiduciary or nonfiduciary power.  Retention of such a 
power, however, does not trigger estate taxation as a “power of appointment” and is specifically 
excluded from such taxation as an administrative power because it is no more than “an 
administrative power” that cannot impact “beneficial enjoyment” of trust property.110  Likewise it 
does not fall within the parameters of a retained power triggering inclusion in the gross estate for 
similar reasons.
111
  It is these distinct differences in the treatment of such power that yields the 
opportunity to target tax consequences. 
The DING and NING also capitalize on distinct differences in treatment of powers to obtain the 
targeted tax results that provide status as a regular (nongrantor) trust for income tax purposes, 
incomplete gift treatment, estate tax inclusion, and creditor protection for both grantor and 
beneficiaries.
112
  Obtaining these targeted tax consequences rests on the disparate treatment of 
powers under the various tax rules.  When the grantor retains rights to impact beneficial enjoyment, 
whether jointly held or not, those retained powers will cause inclusion in the gross estate of the 
grantor for estate tax purposes and incomplete gift status.
113
  Those same jointly held powers, if the 
joint powerholder has a substantial adverse interest to the grantor, however, will not cause the 
powers to trigger grantor trust status for income tax purposes.
114
  The intricate drafting of powers 
that will result in nongrantor status for income tax purposes and at the same time an incomplete 
transfer for gift tax purposes, and estate tax inclusion is not for the faint hearted.
115
  It is, however, 
possible through the use of powers of appointment to achieve these results and at the same time not 
cause adverse tax consequences to the beneficiary joint powerholders whose powers are deemed to 
be limited powers of appointment.
116
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§ 1.06  Conclusion 
 
The legally enforceable rights created by powers of appointment, and the disparate treatment of 
powers under the Internal Revenue Code can accomplish a variety of tax goals.  Powers of 
appointment can also achieve nontax goals of clients, including control, flexibility and ability to 
avoid creditors provided powers are drafted in a manner that lead to the intended result for both 
state law and tax law purposes.  The immediate creative future of estate planners will likely focus 
on use of powers.  The flexibility to draft terms of the power as necessary to achieve tax and non-
tax results, and the knowledge that those terms inform the economic substance of the rights and 
powers granted, encourage innovative use of powers of appointment by estate planners. 
 
 
 
 
